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Abstract
The result of a referendum delivers a signicant amount of information about social preferences to each composite
member of the society. This paper argues that, beyond this obvious fact, the choice not to o¤er a referendum by
an authority, although permitted to do so, may enhance as well the information individuals posses about social
preferences. The addition of a referendum option in the rules of a game, that is, by enabling the authority to o¤er
referenda at will, results in an assured re-election of authorities that implement socially benecial policies, and in
a decrease of the re-election probability of authorities that implement socially obnoxious policies. In a sense, by
allowing an authority to o¤er referenda, an inescapable Catch-22 is introduced in the game, which inhibits the
re-election of a measure of "bad" authorities and, thus, conrms that one of the main benets of a democratic
institution is the preservation of "good" authorities in power.
1 Introduction
A liberal perception of democratic institutions suggests that they assist the society to preserve
goodauthorities in power and get rid of badones. Institutions of democratic expression such
as elections for president or parliament members are obviously in accordance with this view, as
the voting behavior of the citizens in a political environment incorporates retrospective elements.
Referenda though, even if they are by denition a democratic institution, seem to fall short of an
equivalent palpable correspondence with the mentioned idea. This is due to the specic nature
of the referendum, which contents itself to a binary revelation of social preference between two
alternative policies and renounces any direct connection with authority election. To detect the
existence of a smouldering a¢ nity between referenda and the re-election probability of an authority
in a democratic environment, one should gradually determine the interests of the component
members of this environment and focus on the determinant factors of their behavior.
Authorities, in political environments of representative democracy, like those we experience
today and where there exist a periodical evaluation of the authoritys performance through an
election procedure by the society, nd the goal of remaining in power very important. This
is due to the value of holding o¢ ce which suggests that authorities desire to implement their
preferred policies for as long as they can or that authorities enjoy ego rents during their incumbency
as policy makers. By this fact, it becomes evident that authorities are willing to conscribe all
disposable utensils to convince the society conde the governance to them for the next period as
well. The arguments that follow corroborate the suspicion that institutions of direct democracy,
like referenda, behave like ministrants of socially benecial and executioners of socially detrimental
regimes.
In particular, what this paper attempts to identify, is the necessary set of elements of a political
environment, so as calling for referenda to make sense. We shall focus on the informational impact
that referenda have on the authoritys probability of reelection. The result of a referendum contains
a lot of information about social preferences, and rational individuals should use this information
when it is needed to do so. The idea is partially related to the Aghion and Tirole (1997) discussion
on formal and real authority, in which informational asymmetries dene the amount of real power
distributed among the agents. The following analysis will argue that a referendum alters the beliefs
the society has about its own type, that is, about the distribution of opinions in the given society.
Going back to the literature, one observes that there exists a broad list of researchers that
examined the e¤ects of direct democracy institutions, such as referenda, on many social parameters.
Cronin (1989) discusses the accordance between referenda and the democratic instincts of modern
societies. Frey (1994) points out a polarization e¤ect that the announcement of a referendum
has in the social distribution of opinions while Feld and Savioz (1997) investigate the relationship
of such institutions with the economic performance of the community. Frey and Stutzer (2000)
argue on the positive correlation between institutions of direct democracy and self-reported level
of happiness, after an empirical study they conducted in Switzerland. There are other relevant
studies as well, attached with the idea of electronic democracies (Grossman (1995), Budge (1996))
or with the concept of procedural utility (Frey, Benz, Stutzer (2003)). The aim of this paper,
is to complement this literature, by studying how the inclusion of a referendum option in the
authoritys choice set a¤ects the authoritys re-election probability. An experimental approach,
which verges to this papers attempt, has been conducted by Klor and Winter (2007) and suggests
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that provision of information on social preferences to the voters increases the total welfare of the
society. Even if this experiment was primarily conducted to provide a clear understanding on the
interaction between public opinion polls and voters turnout in the elections, it supplied interesting
information concerning the inuence that the disclosure of information about social preferences
may induce on an authoritys re-election chances.
The analytical tools that are used in this paper and are worth mentioning, are the standard
cornerstones of the political economy literature. Hotellings (1929) contribution on the stability
of competition and The economic theory of democracy by Downs (1957) combined with the
concepts that support the utilitarian setting of Sen (1986) and Samuelson (1983), o¤er a productive
framework and an exciting playground. The general modeling framework refers to the, so called,
agenda control literature and will attempt to complement the ndings of Romer and Rosenthal
(1978), Denzau, Mackay (1983), Banks (1990) and Lupia (1992). In this literature, as in this
papers model, a setter can decide whether to o¤er or not a referendum to the voters, but, unlike
the goals of this paper, the mentioned literature limits its interest in identifying which shall be
the policy outcome of the procedure in various environments of asymmetric information. As it has
been, alreday, stated, the most evident di¤erence of this paper to the related literature consists of
the augmented goal of identifying the e¤ects that the existence of a referendum option induces on
the re-election probability of an authority, apart from policy outcomes that such procedures incur.
1.1 The informational impact of the Referendum
A referendum consists, normaly, of two alternatives that are o¤ered for a public vote, and its out-
come identies one of these two as the alternative most preferred by the majority of the individuals.
It slickly follows that referenda have a direct, and obvious, e¤ect on the informational environment
of the society. That is, by the public announcement of the referenda result, information about
social preferences is delivered to the society and to the authority. In a world of perfect information
the result of a referendum would not have any informational impact as the information is already
perfect, but in a more realistic environment of imperfect information the result could help the
society and the authority retrieve information related to social preferences.
If we consider the simple example of a politically isolated individual with no information about
the preferences of other individuals in the society, then it would not be an exaggeration to claim
that this individual assigns to each possible distribution of opinions the same probability of being
identical to the real distribution of opinions of the given society. As he has no information, all
conceivable distributions may be identical to the real one, and, thus, his information is actually
described by a distribution over all possible distributions of opinions of the society. Now, if
this individual observes the outcome of a referendum that the authority has previously o¤ered
then he improves his information. That is, if alternative alpha has collected more votes than
alternative omega (alpha was preferred by the majority of the society) then the individual can
use this information and exclude from his prior beliefs on possible distributions of opinions of the
society, all distributions that fail to justify the result of the referendum.
What this paper attempts to identify is whether this possibility of informational renement,
that the existence of a referendum option o¤ers, breeds alterations related to the authoritys welfare
or not. If such cases are identied then one could consider that the referendum option itself is
either a powerful weapon or a grenade detached from its safety ring in the authoritys arsenal.
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2 The Model
The policy space that shall be considered will be formaly represented by the segment [0; 1]  <.
Let the society be a continuum of individuals (voters) characterized by their ideal policy and are
distributed in [0; 1] according to a distribution function F (i). Preferences of the individuals on
policy outcomes are single-peaked. We formally dene the utility of an individual i 2 [0; 1] after the
implementation of a policy p 2 [0; 1] by: ui(p) =  jp  ij, where i is the ideal point of individual
i. The median voter m is dened by F (m) = 1=2: Dene b 2 [0; 1] to be a direct decision of
the authority. A referendum is formally dened as a pair fd1; d2g where d1 2 [0; 1], d2 2 [0; 1] ,
d1 < d2 and the winner alternative of the referendum is dened as w(fd1; d2g;m) 2 fd1; d2g: In our
framework, the authority is interested both in implementing its ideal policy and in holding o¢ ce,
and sorts these objectives in an absolute priority manner (lexicographic preferences). Following
the assumptions of the related literature (see eg. Lupia 1992), the decision to o¤er a referendum is
costly. The authority will take an action  2 
 that will determine the policy outcome p 2 [0; 1].
So we consider the policy outcome as a function of the authoritys action, p() which suggests that
ui() =  jp()   ij: An action  is either a direct decision b or a referendum fd1; d2g followed
by a direct decision b. In other words an action  is a pair f0; bg if no referendum is o¤ered,
and a pair ffd1; d2g; bg if a referendum is o¤ered. So 
 is the set that contains all possible
actions of the authority. We shall refer to a specic authority by its ideal policy r 2 [0; 1]: Given
the above, the utility of an authority r after choosing an action  can be formally dened by:
ur(vA(); vB(); vC()), where vA() =  jp()  rj, vB() = h(), vC() =  c if a referendum is
o¤ered and vC() = 0 if not. Note that h() is the probability of r being reelected. The authoritys
preferences satisfy ur(vA(); vB(); vC()) > ur(vA(0); vB(0); vC(0)) if for any ; 0 2 
 either
vA() > vA(
0), or vA() = vA(0) and vB() > vB(0) or vA() = vA(0), vB() = vB(0) and
vC() > vC(
0) hold.
The game is constructed in the following way. In the rst stage an authority r is randomly
selected from the population. In the second stage the authority has to take an action  2 

as described above. If a referendum is o¤ered z(d1); z(d2); which are dened as the percentage
of the population that voted for d1 and d2 respectably, are announced. In the third stage the
authority implements the policy p(). Finally, in the last stage, a challenger r0 appears and the
society chooses by voting either to preserve authority r in power or to elect challenger r0 as the
new authority. The challengers r0 policy preferences are unknown to the society, that is, the choice
between r and r0 is equivalent to the choice between preserving authority r and randomly picking a
new one from F (i): For r, and equivalently for r0, to win this election procedure, a simple majority
of votes is su¢ cient.
In the second stage, if the authority actually chooses to o¤er a referendum fd1; d2g then an
individual i votes for the alternative d1 i¤ jd1  ij < jd2  ij and vice versa. Given the preferences
of the individuals (single-peakedness in a single dimension) and Blacks theorem, the alternative
that will be preferred by a majority is the one that is preferred by the median voter m, and
this is why w(fd1; d2g;m) is a function of m. We will have that, w(fd1; d2g;m) is equal to d1 if
jm  d1j < jm  d2j and to d2 if jm  d1j > jm  d2j:
In the last stage p() will already have been implemented and individuals will be asked to vote
for or against the authority r. For an individual i to vote for r it is necessary that ui() > Eui(0)
where 0 is the action that the next authority r0 will choose, that is the challengers optimal action.
If the authority r is preferred by a majority to the next authority r0 then r remains in o¢ ce for
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the next period as well. Note that all voting procedures of this game will be compulsory.
At this point a preliminary result can be stated, which will provide a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the authority r to be re-elected
Proposition 1 Authority r that takes an action  will be re-elected if and only if the median voter
m votes for its re-election, that is, if and only if um() > Eum(0).
Note that, given this result, which states that the authority r will be re-elected if and only if
the median voter votes for its re-election, the probability of an authority r being re-elected after
the choice of an action  can be formulated as h() = prob[um() > Eum(0)]:
The analysis that will follow, will distinguish between the two extreme cases with respect to the
information individuals have about F (i): In the rst case we will consider perfect information about
the distribution of opinions F (i) by every member of the society and in the second case we shall
consider a wide informational asymmetry between the authority, that will have full information
about F (i); and the society, which will have less information about F (i):
2.1 Complete Information
Both the authority r and the society have perfect information about the form of F (i) in this case.
Since lexicographic preferences have been assumed, the problem of the authority r is described as
follows:
1. Select 
1  
 s.t. 81 2 
1; 1 = argmaxfvA()g:
2. Select 
2  
1 s.t. 82 2 
2; 2 = argmaxfvB()g:
3. Select 
3  
2 s.t. 83 2 
3; 3 = argmaxfvC()g:
Then every  2 
3 is dened to be an optimal action for the authority. We shall briey name
all  2 
3 as : It is a strategy renement utility maximization program. As preferences are
lexicographic, the authority isolates primarily the strategies that maximize vA; then renes this
selection and keeps just those that o¤er the higher value for vB; and respectively with vC : Hence,
we can state that all optimal actions of the authority r, that is, all  are such that p() = r.
Proposition 2 If both the authority and the individuals have perfect information on F (i), then
the optimal action of an authority r is  = (0; r):
What becomes as well evident in this setup, is the fact that an authority r either gets re-elected
with certainty (h() = 1) or does not get re-elected also with certainty (h() = 0): This is because
the authority can compute both um() and Eum(0) accurately and, thus, estimate its re-election
probability precisely as well. In short an authority r, such that its optimal action, as dened above,
begets um() > Eum(0), gets re-elected with probability one (h() = 1), and an authority r; such
that its optimal action, begets um() < Eum(0), gets re-elected with probability zero (h() = 0):
In this setup, authorities have no interest in o¤ering a referendum as it can not increase either
vA or vB and just introduces a cost. But since games of perfect information are far from being
reallistic one should try to investigate what is the behavior of an authority in environments of
asymmetric information.
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2.2 Asymmetric Information
Obviously, one could come up with numerous di¤erent combinations of informational asymmetries
between the two participating entities of the game, but the case that is of particular interest in
this paper is the one in which the authority has full information on the specic form of F (i) and
the individuals do not. Authorities, due to their power distinctiveness characteristic tend to have
an extended set of means at their disposal to gratify their goals. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that they are in a position to use monitoring instruments, such as public opinion services, and
have a great deal of information about the policy preferences of the society.
If individuals do not know the exact form of F (i) due to a low level of political communication
among them, it is rational to dene their prior beliefs on the social distribution of opinions as
follows. Consider the set ; dened as the set that contains all conceivable cumulative distributions
in [0; 1]: Then dene a set X  ; such that X = fF1(i); F2(i)g; assuming that F (i) 2 X; and the
other cumulative distribution is randomly drawn from : Finally, consider a probability distribution
over X given by q1 and q2 with q1; q2 > 0 and q1 + q2 = 1; where qj is the probability of Fj(i)
being identical to F (i): In short, individuals are unsure about the distribution of ideal points in the
society, and consider that any of the two elements in X could be the real distribution with a certain
probability. On the other hand, the authority is, equivalently, uncertain about the behavior of the
individuals in the forthcoming elections. It makes sense to assume that an authority possesses all
the necessary monitoring instruments that can collect information related to the societys policy
preferences, but it would demand a gigantic and, relatively, senseless step to consider that an
authority is in a position to gather information on what individuals believe concerning the social
distribution of policy preferences. Thus, we shall summarize the information the authority has
on the probability distribution (q1; q2) by the cumulative distribution Q(q1): This is not going to
a¤ect, in any substancial manner, the following analysis, but is added just for the provision of a
more realistic framework.
An observation that guarantees the validity of the following analysis is that the set X satises a
criterion of the minimum di¤erentiation. This criterion implies that given the generic construction
of X there exist at least one s 2 (0; 1) such that F1(s) 6= F2(s), with probability one. In rst sight
this might not look self-evident, but if one considers the composition of X; that is, a random draw
of one cumulative distribution out of the set of all conceivable cumulative distributions and F (i),
then its validity becomes rather obvious.
Hence in this asymmetric information framework the game preserves its previous characteris-
tics augmented with the above. In the rst stage an authority r is randomly selected from the
population. In the second stage the authority has to take an action  2 
. If a referendum is
o¤ered z(d1); z(d2) are announced. In the third stage the authority implements the policy p()
and individuals update their beliefs about F (i). Finally, in the last stage the society chooses by
voting to keep the authority or to randomly choose another one out of the population.
To make the statement of the following proposition more concrete and congnizable we shall
proceed in the following classications of the possible authorities given F (i); X and Q(q1) and in
the denition of the Catch-22 in this framework.
Note that in this informational setup the expectations that the median voter has on the chal-
lengers r0 optimal action 0 depend on X and on q1: That is, Eum(0) =  q1
1R
0
jm   r0jdF1(r0)  
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(1  q1)
1R
0
jm  r0jdF2(r0):
Denition 1 An authority G is any authority r with 
1 such that 8 2 
1 and 8q1 2 [0; 1] we
have that um() > Eum(0):
Denition 2 An authority B is any authority r with 
1 such that 8 2 
1 and 8q1 2 [0; 1] we
have that um() < Eum(0):
Denition 3 An authority G0 is any authority r with 
1 such that for at least one  2 
1 we
have that um() < Eum(0) for some values of q1 and um() >  
1R
0
jm  r0jdF (r0)
Denition 4 An authority B0 is any authority r with 
1 such that for at least one  2 
1 we
have that um() > Eum(0) for some values of q1 and um() <  
1R
0
jm  r0jdF (r0)
Authorities of type G and G0 are "good" authorities in the sense that, in an environment of
complete information (as modeled in the previous section), they would be re-elected with proba-
bility one. Equivalently, authorities of type B and B0 are "bad", in the sense that undr complete
information, they would be re-elected with probability zero. The di¤erence between G and G0 is
that G has a probability of re-election equal to one, because independently of the voters beliefs
on the true distribution of opinions in the society (8q1 2 [0; 1]) we have that um() > Eum(0);
whereas G0 authoritys re-election depends on these beliefs. If we assume that F1(i) = F (i) then
h() = 1 Q(_q1) 2 (0; 1)1:Respectively, the di¤erence between B and B0 is that B has a probabil-
ity of re-election equal to zero, because independently of the voters beliefs on the true distribution
of opinions in the society (8q1 2 [0; 1]) we have that um() < Eum(0); whereas B0 authoritys
re-election depends on societys beliefs. If we assume that F1(i) = F (i) then h() = Q(
_
q1) 2 (0; 1):
So, in this environment of asymmetric information, unlike the complete information scenario,
there exist "good" authorities that might not be re-elected given some values of q1 and, equivalently,
some "bad" authorities can be re-elected for some values of q1:
Summarising the above, authorities r; such that jm  rj <
1R
0
jm  r0jdF (r0) are authorities that
the society would like to re-elect (provided the society had full information about F (i)), and will
be, thus, named "good" authorities (G and G0). On the other hand, authorities r; such that
jm   rj >
1R
0
jm   r0jdF (r0) are authorities that the society would not like to re-elect (provided
the society had full information about F (i)), and will, respectively, be called "bad" (B and B0).
By denition no value of r is "good" or "bad" independently of F (i). Thus, it would be wise
to distinguish two sets of cases. The rst one consists of the cases that o¤er information to the
individuals just by the policy that the authority decides to implement (p() = r) and the second
one of the cases that o¤er information to the individuals by the full action . To make things
clear imagine an authority r; such that jm   rj <
1R
0
jm   r0jdFj(r0);8 Fj(i) 2 X; that is, a type
1When F1(i) = F (i); then G0 type authorities satisfy:  
1R
0
jm   r0jdF1(r0) < um() <  
1R
0
jm   r0jdF2(r0): Which implies that
um() < Eum(0); if q1 2 [0;
_
q1) and um() > Eum(0); if q1 2 (
_
q1; 1] resulting in h() = 1 Q(
_
q1)
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G authority. The median voter (always m refers to the original distribution F (i)) is willing to
re-elect this authority no matter which Fj(i) 2 X is the real one. Hence, r is always re-elected
and, thus, the authority is not willing to take the cost of o¤ering a referendum. In the symmetric
case an authority r; such that jm  rj >
1R
0
jm  r0jdFj(r0);8 Fj(i) 2 X; that is a type B authority;
is not going to receive the vote of the median voter with probability one and, thus, the authority
is not willing to take the cost of o¤ering a referendum. In a sense, this is an equivalent framework
as the one of complete information. The information individuals have about the social preferences
and the implemented policy p() are su¢ cient to o¤er to a "good" authority a certain re-election
and to a "bad" authority a certain failure in the forthcoming elections.
The second set of cases include the rest and is a game very similar to the Spence signaling
model. For simplicity, assume that F (i) = F1(i): We consider here the authorities r; such that
jm   rj <
1R
0
jm   r0jdF1(r0) and jm   rj >
1R
0
jm   r0jdF2(r0), that is, of type G0, and authorities
r; such that jm   rj >
1R
0
jm   r0jdF1(r0) and jm   rj <
1R
0
jm   r0jdF2(r0), that is, of type B0: As
we dened, each Fj(i) 2 X is believed by the individuals to be identical to the real one with
probability qj: A type G0 authority, can o¤er a referendum and signal its "good" type. This is
guaranteed by the criterion of the minimum di¤erentiation introduced above. That is, an action
(fd1; d2g; r); such that F1((d1 + d2)=2) 6= F2((d1 + d2)=2) always exists in 
: If such a referendum
is o¤ered, then the updated beliefs of the individuals will result in q1 = 1 and, thus, h() = 1: The
authority in other words would have presented veriable information to the society that the real
distribution of opinions is F1(i) and, in this way, that it is a "good" authority, worthy of being
re-elected. What would a "bad" authority, r of type B0;do in this case? First of all, its obvious
that B0 type authorities despise informative referenda, as they guarantee them a zero probability
of re-election. So lets assume that the individuals observe no referendum. They examine each
element of X separately. Starting with F1(i) each individual considers the following. Would the
authority be reelected if it presented veriable information that Fj(i) = F (i)? Or in more formal
manner, does jmj   rj <
1R
0
jmj   r0jdFj(r0) hold for Fj(i)? The answer could be either "yes" or
"no". After answering these 2 questions the individual has a result. If all the answers are "no" then
obviously the authority is a "bad" one and no update of beliefs takes place (no Fj(i) is assigned
a qj = 0 ). If there appear "yes" answers then Fj(i) 2 X that gave the answer "yes" (say F2(i))
is subject to the following renement. If jm2   rj >
1R
0
jm2   r0jdF1(r0) for F2(i) 2 X individuals
assign zero probability to F2(i) being the real one and, hence, probability one to F1(i) being the
real one. :
To formally dene this belief renement process, the Catch-22 notion shall be introduced at
this point.
Denition 5 Assuming F1(i) = F (i); the Catch-22 is active if and only if jm2   rj <
1R
0
jm2  
r0jdF2(r0) and jm2   rj
1
>
R
0
jm2   r0jdF1(r0); where m2 is such that F2(m2) = 1=2:
If the authority r decides not to o¤er a referendum and the Catch-22 is active, it means that
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assuming F2(i) = F (i) then r is of type G0. But if r is of type G0 then a referendum should be
observed, and since it is not, individuals infer that F2(i) 6= F (i): In this way elements of X are
assigned zero probability of representing the truth, and real information is delivered to the society
which leads to a re-election probability h() = 0 for the B0 type authorities that are trapped
in this Catch-22. B0 type authorities that dodge the Catch-22 conditions, preserve a re-election
probability h() = Q(
_
q1):
Having described in detail all elements that take part in the optimal action choice and dene
the re-election probability of an authority r in this asymmetric information environment, it is
easy to formally summarize the ndings of the preceding analysis by the means of the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Given the described informational environment and assuming F1(i) = F (i); the
optimal action  and the respective re-election probability h() of an authority of type:
 G is  = (0; r) and h() = 1;
 B is  = (0; r) and h() = 0;
 G0 is  = (fd1; d2g; r) and h() = 1, s.t. F1[(d1 + d2)=2] 6= F2[(d1 + d2)=2];
 B0 is  = (0; r) and h() = 0 if the Catch-22 is active,
 B0 is  = (0; r) and h() = Q(_q1) if the Catch-22 is inactive.
3 Catch-22?
The denition of a Catch-22 appears to be very simple but if one attempts to reach its origins
might be confronted with an extended eld of analytical obstacles. In the namesake novel J.Heller
illustrates the nature of this catch as a game of no consequence of choice. More explicitly, we can
describe it by the following denition given by Brams (1994). If a rational player participates in
a game, where he has to choose among a nite number of alternative actions, and the payo¤ that
each action generates is equal to worst or next worst payo¤, then we may say that this rational
player is confronted with a catch-22.
In our framework the existence of the described notion is present and one could safely frame
it by the means of the following example. In the asymmetric information environment consider
r = 1=4 + "; X = fF1(i); F2(i)g; where F1(i) is a uniform distribution in [0; 1]; that is, m1 = 1=2,
1R
0
jm1  r0jdF1(r0) = 1=4 and F2(i) is such that the median m2 = 3=4 and that
1R
0
jm2  r0jdF2(r0) <
1=4:We observe that if the real distribution of opinions F (i) = F1(i) then r = 1=4+ " is a "good"
authority, and if F (i) = F2(i) then it is a "bad" one. Let us assume for the time being that
F (i) = F1(i): If the authority takes an action  = ((fd1; d2g; r)j such that z(d1); z(d2) imply that
q1 = 1 and F1(i) = F (i)) then its probability of re-election will be h() = 1: Moving to the next
step, that is, in case F (i) = F2(i) then if the authority takes an action  = ((fd1; d2g; r)j such
that z(d1); z(d2) imply that q2 = 1 and F2(i) = F (i)) then its probability of re-election will be
h() = 0: If, instead, the authority takes an action  = (0; r) then the individuals will assert that
that F2(i) = F (i) with q2 = 1 as if that was not the case, the authority would prefer to signal
it. Thus, the "bad" authority in this example is guaranteed a re-election probability of h() = 0
whatever action it takes.
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As we have observed, the decision to o¤er a referendum bets the Spence signaling game and,
thus, the Catch-22 is the, equivalently to the Cho and Kreps intuitive criterion, truth divulgement
automatism of the present game.
And, since one of the main objectives of democratic institutions is believed to be the exclusion
of the "bad" authorities from the governance of a society, the result presented above avows itself
an ally of this common wisdom. Moreover, one could add to this the comparative analysis between
two di¤erent environments, from which the rst one would allow the authority to o¤er referenda
and the second one would not.
3.1 Comparative analysis
Consider an environment, as described in the model, where authorities are allowed to o¤er referenda
and with the informational asymmetries described above. Dene hgR(
) the re-election probability
of a "good" authority r; such that jm  rj <
1R
0
jm  r0jdF (r0) that has taken its optimal action 
and hbR(
) the re-election probability of a "bad" authority r; such that jm  rj >
1R
0
jm  r0jdF (r0)
that has taken its optimal action  in the described environment:
Now consider an environment, where authorities are not allowed to o¤er referenda. Dene
hgNR(
) the re-election probability of a "good" authority r; such that jm   rj <
1R
0
jm   r0jdF (r0)
that has taken its optimal action  and hbNR(
) the re-election probability of a "bad" authority
r; such that jm  rj >
1R
0
jm  r0jdF (r0) that has taken its optimal action : In this case an action
 = b 2 [0; 1] and vC = 0 as no referenda are allowed.
Theorem 1 The re-election probability of a "good" authority is weakly higher in a game that allows
for referenda than in a game that does not.
Proof. By the third proposition (8) we know that hgR(
) = 1: But what is the re-election
probability of the same authority when the game does not allow for referenda? The beliefs about
the real distribution of opinions F (i) are q1 + q2 = 1: As we have dened, the authority has
expectations on the exact value of q1 given by Q(q1): So if the "good" authority is of type G then
hgNR(
) = 1 and if it is of type G0 then hgNR(
) < 1.
Theorem 2 The re-election probability of a "bad" authority is weakly lower in a game that allows
for referenda than in a game that does not.
Proof. If the authority is of type B then hbR(
) = hbNR(
) = 0: If it is of type B0 and the
Catch-22 is inactive then hbR(
) = hbNR(
) > 0; and if it is of type B0 and the Catch-22 is active
then hbR(
) = 0 < hbNR(
):
By the means of this simple comparative exercise, we observe that just the inclusion of the
referendum option, and not necessaryly a referendum realization, in the set of the institutional
rules of a political game (in the constitution of a state for example) increases the probability of
re-election of socially benecial authorities, and pulverizes the hopes of re-election of a measure
of socially obnoxious authorities. The existence of a referendum option in the authoritys choice
set allows "good" authorities to use referenda so as to help society increase its level of information
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about social preferences and, through this process, secure a certain re-election. On the contrary
the existence of a referendum option functions as a lter which obstructs a certain set of bad
authorities from being re-elected, even if a referendum never takes place.
4 Discussion of Assumptions and Results
In Caillaud and Tirole (2006) the issue of persuasion of a group by a sponsor of a proposal
is treated. In the setup of their model, group members have prior beliefs on the value of the
project and the proposer is allowed to transmit veriable information to some of them. In our
case, referenda are used by "good" authorities to convince voters that they are actually worthy of
being re-elected. They are a persuasion mechanism comparable to the presentation of veriable
information discussed by Caillaud and Tirole.
Therefore, the existence of a referendum option in such political environments, improves the
wellbeing of the society as they rene the beliefs individuals have about the authoritys type. From
a social point of view, any game between a society and its appointed authority has a special moral
characteristic. Unlike theory, societys objective is not only to detect the optimal behavior of an
authority but, moreover, to discover ways through which the welfare for the society could increase.
In this direction, referenda, among their other characteristics, enhance social welfare as they have
proven to be a stream of information that delivers evidence about the social distribution of opinions
and, thus, about the type of the authority.
But is the structure of the model general enough? One could argue that imperfect information
does not limit in the case in which individuals consider just two distributions as the possible true
ones. And this would be a fair claim. In fact, the less information individuals have about the dis-
tribution of opinions the more distributions they should consider as possibly true. But, since the
criterion of minimum di¤erentiation holds in any discrete set of randomly chosen distributions, the
equilibrium described in proposition two remains valid for any discrete set of considered distribu-
tions. Also, the strong result of the third proposition, which implies that in an environment where
referenda are allowed "good" authorities are re-elected with probability one, remains valid as well.
The only case in which enlargement of the set of the considered distributions is e¤ective, is the
probability of re-election computation of a "bad" authority. Even with a large set of distributions
the results of the strategic considerations of the individuals shall come up with the eliminations of
mistaken distributions (never the real distribution is eliminated from the set), but since an update
in the beliefs follows, no positive norm on the probability of re-election may be stated.
Another element which appears in all discussions related with referenda, is the existence or not
of a commitment rule. Authorities may be committed to implement the result of referendum or
not by the constitution. The preceding analysis is not restrained by the existence of such a rule,
because, referenda design is modeled in a way that permits any policy to be the winner of such
a process. Authorities o¤er referenda if it is in their interest to inform the society in which way
opinions are distributed, and they may do so, even if a commitment dimension exists.
Moreover, the specic modelling of the authorities preferences is hardly understood in this paper
in the exact conventional manner, but, it incorporates all classical objectives of an authority in
an absolute priority ordering. Lexicographic preferences capture the observation that when an
authority faces a choice among a set of actions is hardly ever indi¤erent. The analysis focuses, as
a large part of the related literature, on policy oriented authorities. The combined existence, in
the same environment, of both policy and power oriented (in the sense that there could exist that
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could have re-election as their rst priority) authorities surpasses the aim of the current paper.
In an attempt to focus on the pure force that the informational part of a referendum exhibits on
the electoral behavior of the voters, assuming that the authority has the described lexicographic
preferences is prudent. Any further complication, by introducing for example di¤erent degrees of
interest among the two authority goals (implementation of its ideal policy and re-election) would
require extra assumptions, such as the voters expectations on these degrees, and would generate
analytical obstacles without enhancing the intuitive signicance of the results. Authorities after
all wish to stay in power if their benet from holding o¢ ce is larger than the benet they would
have if another authority was in power. In an ideological framework where ego rents are absent,
no authority has any interest in implementing a policy that is not individually benecial just to
be there.
Finally, one could argue, that a study of more informational environments could be desirable.
The possibility, for example, that the authority is also uncertain about the specic distribution
of opinions in the society is not negligible. But would the detailed study of such a case improve
the intuition we get from the existing ndings? A brief overlook of the case allows the positive
response, no. That is because authorities that are "good" or "bad" independently of which of the
considered distributions is the true one, would behave exactly as before. And authorities that do
not know if they are "good" or "bad" would o¤er referenda only in the case that their information
suggested that they are "good" with high probability. Extra assumptions would be required, such
as the relative quality of information between the authority and the society, without changing the
analysis basic result, that is, the existence of the referendum option would presumably increase, in
that case as well, the durability of a "good" authority and decrease the life-length of a "bad" one.
5 Conclusions
Referenda are democratic institutions with complicated features and a variety of dimensions. One
of them, as demonstrated by the paper, is the informational impact they have on the electorates
behavior in the forthcoming authority elections. An authority can be viewed as "good" or "bad"
only in contrast with the specic distribution of opinions of the society it interacts with. Referenda
succour an imperfectly informed electorate in identifying whether their authority belongs in the
rst or the second category. Indistinguishable "good" authorities seem to be the ones that call for
referenda in order to reveal their characteristics to the society and all the other tend to prefer not
to, as they have no interest in doing so. A part of the indistinguishable "bad" authorities that, as
all other bad authorities, prefers not to o¤er referenda, is subject to an inescapable Catch-22 which
annihilates all hope of them being re-elected. As a result of the above, a comparative study of two
games, with the only di¤erence between them the existence or not of the referendum option, clearly
proves the fact that if the political environment allows an authority to o¤er referenda, then the
probability of re-election of the "good" authorities is higher than if it did not, and correspondingly
lower probability of re-election of the "bad" ones. A result that reinforces the belief that democratic
institutions in general, and not just elections for authorities, are weapons in the societys disposal
against the preservation of prejudicial authorities in power.
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7 Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1) Given the specic structure of the game and the authoritys utility maxi-
mization program, um() = Eum(0) is a probability zero event and, thus, we shall not study this
case explicitly. In the following analysis Eui(0) will take two di¤erent forms. In the complete in-
formation case, we will have that Eui(0) =  
1R
0
ji r0jdF (r0): In the asymmetric information case,
we will instead encounter Eui(0) =  q1
1R
0
ji r0jdF1(r0)  (1 q1)
1R
0
ji r0jdF2(r0), where q1 2 [0; 1]:
Dene Z(i) =  ji rj+
1R
0
ji r0jdF (r0) and (i) =  ji rj+q1
1R
0
ji r0jdF1(r0)+(1 q1)
1R
0
ji r0jdF2(r0):
Consider Z(m) < 0 (or, equivalently, (m) < 0) : If we demonstrate that there exist a measure of
is in F (i) at least equal to 1/2, such that, for these is Z(i) < 0 ((m) < 0); then, we are done.
To show this, we will need the derivative of Z(i) ((i)); with respect to i: We get that Z 0(i) =
 [(i p())=ji p()j]+2F (i) 1 (0(i) =  [(i p())=ji p()j]+2[q1F1(i)+(1  q1)F2(i)] 1),
which becomes Z 0(i) = 1 + 2F (i)   1 = 2F (i)  0 for all i < r (0(i)  0 for all i < r) and
Z 0(i) =  1 + 2F (i)  1 = 2F (i)  2  0 for all i > r (0(i)  0 for all i > r): All statements that
follow and concern Z(i) are identical for (i): Assume, rst, that Z(i) < 0: In the case of m > r;
we have that Z(i)  Z(m) < 0 for all i  m: If m < r; then we have that Z(i)  Z(m) < 0 for all
i  m: Now assume that Z(m) > 0, we observe that, if m > r and r > E(r0) then, since Z 0(i)  0
for all i > r, we get Z(m)  Z(i)  Z(1) for all i > r: Since, r > E(r0), then Z(1) = r E(r0) > 0,
which suggests that Z(i) > 0 for all i > r: If r < E(r0) then Z(0) =  r + E(r0) > 0 and, since
Z 0(i)  0 for all i < r; we get that Z(i)  Z(0) > 0 for all i < r:We moreover know that Z 0(i)  0
for all i > r, which implies that, Z(i)  Z(m) > 0 for all i 2 (r;m): The proof for the Z(m) > 0
and m < r case is equivalent to the last one.
Proof. (Proposition 2) Authorities maximize rst vA; which, by denition, is maximized by any
 2 
 such that p(a) = r. That implies 
1 contains the direct decision action (0; r) and all the
referenda actions (fd1; d2g; r) which are innitely many. Since Eui(0) =  
1R
0
jm   r0jdF (r0) is
a xed number and ui() = ui(^); 8; ^ 2 
1 we get that h() = prob[um() > Eum(0)] is
constant for all  2 
1, that is, 
1 = 
2: But as it is easy to observe, 
2 contains only one action
 = (0; r) that is costless for the authority. That is, vC((0; r)) = 0 while all other actions in 
2
induce vC((fd1; d2g; r)) =  c: Thus, 
3 = f(0; r)g and  = (0; r):
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